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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD.

1. MESSRS. PINCUS AND PAUL, STAFF MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SFRC, WILL BE VISITING YOUR POST AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL. THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS PROJECTED AN IN-DEPTH TWO-

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YEAR STUDY ON OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASES AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. YOU HAVE NO DOUBT
FOLLOWED THEIR EARLIER TRIP TO SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE
HEARINGS WITH REGARD TO SPAIN AND TURKEY, AS WELL AS
THOSE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC WHICH HAVE ENSUED.

- THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO LEARN FROM AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OFFICIALS STATIONED IN THOSE COUNTRIES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT OUR FACILITIES, AGREEMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN THOSE COUNTRIES; ALSO OUR MILITARY COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE THERE, AND THE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS TO BE DERIVED FROM SUCH ACTIVITIES AND PRESENCE. THESE REPRESENTATIVES, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES, WANT FULL INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE ITEMS LISTED ABOVE. THEY WILL HOPE TO TALK TO THE AMBASSADOR AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF EACH EMBASSY, AS WELL AS THE CHIEF U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPUTIES IN EACH COUNTRY, AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT CONSULTATIONS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY FORCES OF OUR COUNTRY AND THOSE IN THE HOST COUNTRY ON MATTERS SUCH AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, JOINT EXERCISES, COORDINATION OF MISSIONS, TRADE EVALUATION, AND VARIOUS POLITICO-MILITARY MATTERS.
- 3. A MAJOR THRUST OF THE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT FULL STATE DEPT POLICY CONTROL AND CIVILIAN CONTROL WITHIN DOD HAVE BEEN EXERCISED AT ALL STAGES. THE TENOR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE APPEARS TO BE IN FAVOR OF A CONTRACTION OF OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OVERSEAS, AS EVIDENT BY THEIR INTEREST IN DETAILS OF INSTALLATIONS AND U.S. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, AND PARTICULARLY OF OUR BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS OUTLAY, AS WELL AS AN AVOIDANCE OF ANY REAL OR IMPLIED SECURITY OR OTHER QUID-PRO-QUO (E.G. MAP) COMMITMENTS NOT COVERED BY A SPECIFIC TREATY.
- 4. PINCUS IS AN EXPERIENCED NEWSPAPER MAN, FORMERLY WITH THE WASHINGTON POST, AND PAUL, AN ATTORNEY WITH DOD EXPERIENCE SO THAT BOTH ARE HIGHLY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND WELL PREPARED. THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A FULL EXPOSITION OF THE SITUATION IN YOUR COUNTRY, SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO EXISTING GUIDANCE.
- .5. THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE HAVE DECIDED THAT

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WITNESSES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO
TESTIFY ON CERTAIN NUCLEAR MATTERS OR ON MILITARY CONTINGENCY
PLANS. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF IN
THE FIELD SHOULD BE LIMITED ACCORDINGLY. FURTHER
GUIDELINES ARE SET FORTH BELOW; HOWEVER, IN ANY CASE IN WHICH
ADDRESSEES ARE CONCERNED AS TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF
THESE GUIDELINES, THEY SHOULD ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION AND
REFER THE QUESTION FOR RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON. THE FOLLOWING
MORE DETAILED GUIDELINES SHOULD BE HELPFUL:

- A. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH NATO. DISCUSSION OF NATO STRATEGY WITH MESSRS. PINCUS AND PAUL ON AN APPROPRIATELY CLASSIFIED BASIS SHOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE VARIATION IN POINTS OF VIEW OF DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ON NATO STRATEGY, STRATEGIC WARNING, AND THE URGENCY AND NATURE OF THE THREAT. YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT NATO IS AN ALLIANCE OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS, EACH WITH A POINT OF VIEW SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER, BOUND TOGETHER BY A COMMON APPROACH AND THE WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE FOR THE COMMON GOOD, NOTWITHSTANDING DIFFERENCES.
- B. THE COMMITTEE STAFF SHOULD BE GIVEN FULLY TO UNDERSTAND THE RESERVATION TO GOVERNMENTS OF THE TAKING OF DECISIONS TO COMMIT FORCES TO HOSTILITIES. THE SPECIAL ADVANCE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO CONVENTIONAL AIR DEFENSE UNDER SACEUR AND PROCEDURES PERMITTING ADVANCE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITH REGARD TO THE ALERTS WILL BE EXPLAINED BY WASHINGTON AND USNMR SHAPE ONLY. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT NO NATO PROCEDURE IN ANY WAY CHANGES OR LIMITS OR AFFECTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
- C. NO DETAILS OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS, OR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PAST, PRESENT, OR PROPOSED, WILL BE PROVIDED THE COMMITTEE STAFF. THE EXISTENCE OF CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR BERLIN AND THE NATO AREA AS A WHOLE CAN BE STATED, BUT DETAILED CONTINGENCY PLANS SHALL NOT BE IDENTIFIED NOR DISCUSSED. INCLUDED ARE BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS, COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLANS, SOFTE PLANS, ETC.

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D. THE PRECISE LOCATION OF THE STORAGE SITES, TYPES AND NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INVOLVED, SHALL NOT BE DISCUSSED BEYOND MCNAMARA'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT THERE ARE SOME 7,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN NATO EUROPE. IF STAFF ASKS FOR DETAILS OF OR COPIES OF PERTINENT AGREEMENTS, THEY SHOULD BE ADVISED TO MAKE THAT REQUEST IN WASHINGTON. CONSULTATION PROCEDURES LISTED IN DPC/D(69)58 AND NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP ACTIVITIES WILL BE GENERALLY BRIEFED TO STAFF IN WASHINGTON, AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN THE FIELD. NO OTHER NUCLEAR MATTERS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITHOUT WASHINGTON APPROVAL. IF GRANTED, WE PLAN TO LIMIT ANY DISCUSSION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR MATTERS TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S HEADQUARTERS.

- E. THE SUBCOMMITTEE SEEMS GENERALLY PERSUADED THAT OUR NATO ALLIES ARE CONTRIBUTING LESS THAN A FAIR SHARE IN RESOURCES AND MANPOWER TO THE COMMON DEFENSE. IN BRIEFING THEM ON THIS SUBJECT, DPQ DATA AS TO THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF THE DEFENSE EFFORTS OF THE ALLIES AND ITS ADEQUACY MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR PAST AND PRESENT YEARS ONLY.
- F. REQUESTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE OTHER THAN THAT MADE PUBLIC, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL CONSULTATION OR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON FOR ANSWER.

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- H. REQUESTS FOR ANY INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTS ABOUT WHICH THERE IS ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON.
- I. EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION OVER DENIAL OF ACCESS TO SUCH MATERIAL BUT, IF NECESSARY, YOU MAY ADVISE THEM THAT YOU ARE NOT AURHOTIZED TO FURNISH DOCUMENTS OF THAT SENSITIVITY AT THE POST, BUT WILL REFER THEIR REQUEST TO WASHINGTON FOR THEM TO RAISE HERE WHEN THEY RETURN. IT

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SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PINCUS AND PAUL HAVE REQUESTED A GREAT
MANY DOCUMENTS TO WHICH SPECIFIC REFERENCE WAS MADE IN TESTIMONY
OR IN OTHER DOCUMENTS ALREADY IN THEIR POSSESSION AND HAVE
OBTAINED ACCESS TO MOST OF THEM, SO THEY WILL BE
KNOWLEDGEABLE IN PURSUIT OF FURTHER LEADS.

- 6. DESIRE TO REITERATE THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF BOTH STATE AND DEFENSE TO COOPERATE IN ASSISTING THIS SUBCOMMITTEE TO PURSUE ITS INVESTIGATION WHICH IS WELL WITHIN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONGRESS. WE WILL ADVISE THEM IN A GENERAL OF THE BROAD SENSE OF THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION.
- 7. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPTS IN DETAIL AS TO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STAFF, THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED, THE DOCUMENTS TO WHICH THEY HAD ACCESS AND THOSE WHICH THEY HAD REQUESTED BUT NOT SEEN. COPIES OF ALL PAPERS PROVIDED SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON.
- 8. COMMITTEE STAFF HAVE ADVISED THEY WILL NOT REQUEST CONTACTS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND DO NOT WISH TO ADVERTISE THE VISIT.
- 9. ADDRESSEES ADVISE SUBORDINATE POSTS AND COMMANDS TO BE VISITED AS APPROPRIATE. RICHARDSON

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